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Introduction
Although economists and environmentalists often find themselves on opposite sides of specific issues, they occupy some common ground. A healthful environment is essential for the effective
conduct of economic and other human activities. Even the most
theoretical economist breathes the same air and drinks the same
water as members of the Sierra Club; in fact, he or she may be a
dues-paying member.
Likewise, a strong economy provides the resources for human
activity, including dealing with ecological problems. It also generates the rising living standard that enables citizens to focus on
serious concerns beyond the immediate one of paying for everyday
necessities. Balancing economic and ecological concerns is hardly
an either/or matter.
Any doubt on that score can be resolved by examining the plight
of many East European nations. Their weak economies have been
unable to support the environmental cleanup taking place in Western societies. The result has been "an ecological disaster zone,"
where even the snow is black. Fines levied on polluters are ineffective in their socialized economies because the government, as owner
of all property, ends up paying the penalties. 1
The situation is very different in the United States. Rather than
subordinating environmental concerns to economic goals, we tend to
ignore economic considerations in fashioning public policy on ecological issues.

Public Support and Individual Reluctance
Every poll of citizen sentiment shows overwhelming support for
doing more to clean up the environment. A public opinion survey
by The New York Times and CBS News reported in 1983 that 58 percent of the sample agreed with the following strong statement:
"Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and
standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental
improvements must be made regardless of cost."2
Nevertheless, despite the continuation of such an overwhelming
public mandate and a plethora of new laws and directives by the
Murray Weidenbaum is director of the Center for the Study of American
Business. This report is adapted from Chapter 11 of Murray Weidenbaum,
Rendezvous "'With Reality: The American Economy After Reagan (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1988).
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plus hundreds of billions
of dollars of compliance costs expended by private industry, the
public remains unhappy with the results.
Unfortunately, environmental action is an extremely important
example of not wishing to pay the piper. Those same citizens who
want environmental improvements "regardless of cost" vociferously
and adamantly oppose the location of any hazardous waste facility
in their own neighborhood. Nor are they keen on paying for the
cleanup. Of course, they strongly favor cleaning up the environment, but each prefers to have the dump site located in someone
else's backyard and to have the other fellow pay for it.
An example of this situation is the reaction of the enlightened
citizens of Minnesota to a $3.7 million grant from the EPA to build
and operate a state-of-the-art chemical landfill that could handle
hazardous wastes with a high assurance of safety. In each of the sixteen locations that the state proposed, the local residents raised
such a fuss and howl that the state government backed off. Ultimately, the unspent grant was returned to EPA.
The Minnesota experience is not exceptional. The EPA was also
forced to stop a project to test whether the sludge from a municipal
waste treatment plant could be used as a low-cost fertilizer. The
public opposition was fierce, even though the EPA was going to use
federally owned land and the sludge was expected to increase crop
yields by 30 percent.3
Since 1980, not a single major new disposal facility has been sited
anywhere in the United States. According to a state-by-state review,
the outlook for the future is "even more bleak," in large part because
of a worsening of the emotional atmosphere surrounding any effort
to locate a new dump site.'' As Professor Peter Sandman of Rutgers
University has pointed out, the public perceives environmental matters not only emotionally, but also morally. "Our society," he has
written, "has reached near-consensus that pollution is morally wrong
-- not just harmful or dangerous . . . but wrong. "5 Yet, the
individuals that make up that same public are reluctant personally to
assume the burdens associated with that strongly held view.
This ambivalent attitude toward the environment is not new. In
1969, the National Wildlife Federation commissioned a national
survey to ascertain how much people were willing to pay for a
cleaner environment. At a time of peak enthusiasm for environmental regulation, the public was asked, "To stop the pollution
destroying our plant life and wildlife, would you be willing to pay an
increase in your monthly electric bill of $1 ?" The "no" vote won
hands down, 62 percent to 28 percent (with 10 percent "not sure").6
That study, we should recall, was taken before the big runup in util-

ity bills. Perhaps not too surprisingly, the survey showed strong
support for taxing business to finance environmental cleanup.
In other words, most of us Americans very much want a cleaner
environment, but are neither willing to pay for it nor seriously to
inconvenience ourselves. We try to take the easy way out -- by
imposing the burden on "someone else," preferably a large impersonal institution.

It is much easier for Congress to express a desire for cleaner air
or purer water than for an agency like the EPA to fulfill that desire.
To be sure, vast sums of money have been spent for these purposes
in recent years. From 1970 to 1986, Congress appropriated over $55
billion for the operation of the EPA. The headcount of EPA
employment rose from a few hundred in 1970 to over nine thousand
in 1988. These numbers are dwarfed by the costs incurred in the
private sector to comply with the government's rules on environmental cleanup. The U.S. Council on Environmental Quality estimated the total at over $100 billion for 1988 and over $750 billion
for the preceding decade (in dollars of 1986 purchasing power). 7
These staggering outlays have not prevented the critics from
instituting an almost endless array of lawsuits whose main purpose
is to get the EPA to act faster and to do more. Typical of the
assaults on the EPA is this statement by Congressman James J.
Florio of New Jersey: "They are not in charge. They do not have
the resources by their own actions to get the work done, and they
are more interested in cosmetics than anything."8
The plaintive response of the EPA administrator at the time was
that "EPA's plate is very full right now."9 That plate is being heaped
higher on an almost daily basis. One of EPA's newest responsibilities, for instance, is regulation of genetically engineered pesticides.
Moreover, rapid scientific improvements permit the detection and,
perhaps, regulation of ever more minute quantities of pollutants.
Meanwhile, John Q. Public (and Jane Q. Public) are making the
problem worse. In 1965, the average American disposed of three
pounds of garbage a day. By 1985, that figure was up to four pounds
each day and rising -- in addition to wastes from agriculture, mining,
industry, construction and demolition, sewage, and junked autos. 10
To be sure, the EPA can claim important accomplishments.
Between 1970 and 1985, air pollution from vehicles was reduced by
46 percent for hydrocarbons, 34 percent for carbon monoxide, and
75 percent for lead. Rivers from coast to coast that were nearly
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devoid of life teem with fish once again. Lake Erie, so laden with
pollutants in 1969 that a river feeding into it caught fire, has been
revived. 11
Despite these successes, the EPA frequently falls short in meeting congressionally mandated goals for pollution cleanup. The hard
fact is that the status quo in environmental policy is not sufficient.
Congress continues to pass high-sounding legislation with unrealistic
timetables and inflexible deadlines, while the EPA gets ever greater
responsibility and private industry spends billions more on environmental compliance. In the words of the EPA's former administrator
William Ruckelshaus, "EPA's statutory framework is less a coherent
attack on a complex and integrated societal problem than it is a
series of petrified postures. "12

. comb"med ·
than is produced by the five largest chenu"cal ~mparu~s
The lax situation uncovered by the GAO at Tinker Air Force Ba~e,
in Oklahoma, is typical of the way in which many federal agencies
respond to the EPA's directives: .."Althou~ DOD [Dep~rtment of
Defense] policy calls for the military services to . . . Implement
EPA's hazardous waste management regulations, we found that
Tinker has been selling ... waste oil, fuels, and solvents rather than
... recycling.... nl6

Exceptions to the Rules

The GAO reported that two of the five commercial waste sites
receiving the base's wastes had major complia!lce problems. Also,
personnel at Tinker Air Force Base were dumpmg hazardous wastes
in landfills that themselves were in violation of EPA requirements.
In one case the EPA had been urging the Oklahoma Department of
Health for ~everal years not to renew a landfill's permit. In another
instance the State Water Resources Board was seeking a court
close the site. Civilian agencies, including those in state
order
and local governments continue to be reluctant to follow the same
'
•
•
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environmental standards that they Impose on the pnvate sector.

The Public Sector Drags Its Feet
In addition, misperceptions of the villains in the pollution story
abound. Many people fall into a common trap -- that of associating
polluters exclusively with business. Many companies do generate
lots of pollution. But the same can be said about government agencies, hospitals, schools, and colleges.
Moreover, the EPA lacks the enforcement power over the public
sector that it possesses over the private sector. Reports of plant
closings because of the high cost of meeting environmental standards are common. In contrast, there is no record of a single government facility closing down because it was not meeting ecological
requirements.
It is not surprising, for instance, that the General Accounting
Office (GAO) says that the performance of federal agencies in carrying out the requirements of hazardous-waste disposal "has not
been exemplary." A GAO report issued in 1986 says that, of 72 federal facilities inspected, 33 were in violation of EPA requirements
and 22 had been cited for Class 1 (serious) violations. Sixteen of the
33 facilities remained out of compliance for six months or more.
Three had been out of compliance for more than three years. 13 A
follow-up report by the GAO in 1987 showed little further progress.
Only four of eleven federal agencies had completed the identification of hazardous-waste sites and none had finished assessing the
environmental problems they had uncovered. Of 511 federal sites
failing to meet EPA standards, only 78 had been cleaned up. 14
A major offender is the Department of Defense, which now generates over 500,000 tons of hazardous waste a year. That is more
4

Congress wants a cleaner environment. but so far has not m~tered
the will to impose even modest pollution controls on a polztically
powerful group of constituents --fanners.
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Also, federal policy arbitrarily excludes on~ of .th~ l~rg~st smgle
sources of pollution from the EPA's effective JUriSdiction: the
runoff of pesticides and fertilizers f~om farms. ~8 The EPA reports
that, in six of the agency's ten reg~ons, pollutio~ from farms and
urban streets is the principal cause of water quality problems. But
pollution from these sources remains virtually unregulated.
.
Large quantities of agricultural pollution can be controlled ~al!"ly
easily at low cost by using limited-till plowing techniques. In striking
contrast, industrial pollution control has often been pushed to the
limits of economic feasibility. Nevertheless, Congress follows a
double standard: for urban and industrial pollution it requires the
imposition of tough and detailed standards t? qualify for p~rmits to
discharge wastes. For rural and farm pollution, the EPA IS merely
given money to study the problem.
Like the rest of us, Congress wants a cleaner environment. But
so far it has not mustered the will required to impose the most
modest pollution controls on a politically powerful group of con5

stituents. To be sure, farm families also want a cleaner environment
-- but it is always nice to get someone else to pay for your desires.

Economic Solutions to Hazardous Waste Problems
Turning to specific environmental problems, we can start with
the controversy over the disposal of hazardous wastes. Instances of
toxic-waste contamination at Love Canal, in New York State and at
Times Beach, Missour~ have brought a sense of urgency' to the
problem. The public mood on the subject of hazardous waste leaves
little room for patience -- but much opportunity for emotional
response.
Emotionally charged responses are encouraged by the fact that
even scientists know little about the effects on human health of
many toxic substances, such as the various forms of dioxin. Levels
of some substances can now be measured by the EPA in terms of
parts per billion and occasionally per quadrillion, but even the
experts still debate the significance of exposure at those rates. In
effect, the scare headlines about chemical health hazards deal with
exposures that are akin to the proverbial needle in the haystack.
Actually, the needle-haystack comparison is much too modest. One
part per ~~on is the equivalent of one inch in 16,000 miles, a penny
m $10 ~illi?n, four drops of water in an Olympic-size pool, or a
second m thrrty-two years.
The most severe reaction to dioxin reported so far by humans is
a bad case of chloracne, a severe acne-like rash. The bulk of the
available information on dioxin and other hazards is based on
extrapolating fro~ data on animal experiments, which is very tricky.
~ost tests on anrmals are conducted at extremely high concentrations of the suspected element, which do not reflect real-world
conditions in which the animals (or humans) live. Scientists note
that the massive doses that are fed the animals overwhelm their
entire bodies. Moreover, a level of exposure that is harmful to one
type of animal may not be injurious to another. For example the
lethal dose of the most toxic dioxin (2, 3, 7, 8 TCDD) for hamst~rs is
5,000 times higher than that for guinea pigs. 19 Extrapolating the
results to humans is even more conjectural.
However, our hearts must go out to the people in Times Beach
Missouri, and in Love Canal, New York, who have suffered sever~
financial and psychological damage from the emotional responses to
the scare. stories they have seen and heard so frequently.
In trymg to avoid a repetition of these situations the EPA has
promulgated detailed regulations on how polluters m'ust keep track
6

of hazardous wastes and how they should dispose of them. Because
of growing public concern over leaky and dangerous dump sites,
Congress. in late 1986 extended and expanded Superfund, the program des1gned to clean up hazardous waste sites. The law requires
companies an~ ultimately, consumers to pay $9 billion into Superfund by 1991.2 Yet, despite all this effort and attention, the problem of how to dump hazardous wastes is scarcely less serious than it
was in 1980, before Congress passed the original Superfund law.
As it stands, the law provides for a large fund raised primarily
through taxes on producers of chemical and petroleum products.
The EPA uses this money to identify and clean up hazardous waste
~ites. But little progress is made because, as we noted earlier, there
1S a severe shortage of dump sites.
A more clearheaded view of waste disposal problems is needed
in the United States. Because definitions vary among levels of government, estimates of the amount of hazardous waste disposed of
each year in the United States range from 30 million to 264 million
metric tons. Most of this waste is buried in landfills because incineration, the safest and most effective means of disposal, is nearly ten
times as costly. Even so, government and industry spend over $5
billion each year to manage toxic wastes. The annual cost by 1990 is
projected to reach $12 billion. 21
Many experts believe that using landfills is inherently unsafe, if
for no other reason than that they are only storage sites. Moreover,
there are not enough of them. The EPA estimates that 22,000 waste
sites now exist in the United States, and fully 10 percent of them are
believed to be dangerous and leaking.
The result: not enough reliable, environmentally safe places to
dump toxic substances. Although EPA wants to clean up as many
landfills as possible, it has very little choice as to where to put the
material it removes under the Superfund mandate. Taxpayers may
~ind up paying for the costly removal of waste from one site, only to
fmd later on that they have to pay again for removing it from yet
another dangerous site.
Meanwhile, legal fees mushroom. The litigation costs involving
cleanup at the various Superfund sites are estimated to run somewhere between $3.5 billion and $6.4 billion. 22

Economic Incentives Are Needed
Eventually, society will have to face the main reason for the
scarcity of hazardous-waste sites -- the "not in my backyard" syndrome. Sites for the disposal of toxic substances have joined prisons
and mental hospitals as things the public wants, but not too close by.
The hazardous-waste-disposal problem is not going to disappear
7

unless Americans change to less polluting methods of production
and consumption. Until then, greater understanding is needed on
the part of the public and a willingness to come to grips with the difficult problems arising from the production and use of hazardous
substances. Of course, it will cost large amounts of money (probably
in the hundreds of billions of private and public expenditures in the
next decade) to meet society's environmental expectations. But
spending money may be the easiest part of the problem. Getting
people to accept dump sites in their neighborhoods is much more
difficult.
The answer surely is an appeal not merely to good citizenship but
also to common sense and self-interest. In a totalitarian society,
people who do not want to do something the government desires are
simply forced to do so, with the threat of physical violence ever present. In a free society with a market economy, we offer to pay
people to do something they otherwise would not do. The clearest
example in modern times is the successful elimination of the
military draft coupled with very substantial increases in pay and
fringe benefits for voluntarily serving in the armed forces.
Individual citizens have much to gain by opposing hazardous
waste facilities to be located near them-- and there is a basic logic
to their position. It is not fair for society as a whole to benefit from
a new disposal site, while imposing most of the costs (ranging from
danger of leakage to depressed property values) on the people in
the locality. But local resistance to dealing with hazardous wastes
does impose large costs on society as a whole. Those costs are in
the form both of inhibiting economic progress and having to ship
waste from one temporary site to another.
There is a way of reconciling individual interests and community
concerns. It is by the use of economic incentives. The idea is to
look upon environmental pollution not as a sinful act but as an
activity costly to society and susceptible to reduction by means of
proper incentives. Mter all, the prospect of jobs and income
encourages many communities to offer tax holidays and other
enticements to companies considering the location of a new factory
-- even though it may not exactly improve the physical environment
of the region. Under present arrangements, however, there is no
incentive for the citizens of an area to accept a site for hazardous
wastes in their vicinity, no matter how safe it is.
But perhaps some areas would accept such a facility if the state
government (fmanced by all the citizens benefiting from the disposal
facility) would pay for something the people in that locality want but
cannot afford -- such as a new school building, firehouse, or library
or simply lower property taxes. 23 Unlike an industrial factory, a

A 1987 EPA report concluded that the agency's priorities "do not
correspond well" with its rankings by risk of the various ecological
problems that it is dealing with. Thus, the agency's own study found
areas of high risk but little regulatory effort. A key example is
runoff of polluted water from farms and city streets.
Conversely, the study showed that areas of "high EPA effort but
relatively low risks" included management of hazardous wastes,
cleanup of chemical waste dumps, regulation of underground storage tanks containing petroleum or other hazardous substances, and
municipal solid waste. 26 The reason for this mismatch between
needs and resources is obvious. The EPA's priorities are set by
Congress and reflect public pressure more than scientific knowledge. Driven by the forces of environmental politics, the nation has
repeatedly committed itself to goals and programs that are unrealistic. This has meant deploying regulatory manpower unwisely and
diverting limited resources to concerns of marginal importance.
The results of this mismatch are substantial. Not all hazards are
created equal. Some disposal sites are being filled with innocuous

8
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hazardous-waste facility provides few offsettin} benefits to the local
residents in the form of jobs or tax revenues. 2 (See box on page 10
for examples of the use of incentives.)
There is much that government can do to improve environmental
policy in other ways. The EPA could reduce the entire hazardouswaste problem by distinguishing between truly lethal wastes -- which
clearly should be disposed of with great care -- and wastes that
contain only trace or minute amounts of undesirable materials. To
the extent that changes in legislation would be required, the agency
should urge Congress to make them.
The experience of a company in Oregon provides insights into
why Congress needs to legislate common sense into the antipollution laws. The firm has been dumping heavy-metal sludges on its
property for over twenty years. Company officials told the General
Accounting Office that they automatically classify the material as
hazardous. Why? Because it would be too costly and timeconsuming to try to prove that it was not. The GAO learned from
several industry associations that other companies, similarly uncertain and wanting to avoid expensive testing costs, simply declare
their wastes to be hazardous, whether they really are dangerous or
not. 26 That is not the only example in which those complying with
environmental regulations lose sight of the fundamental objectives
to be met.

Tackling First Things First

Citizens Understand Incentives Even H
Politicians Do Not
An episode in 1985 shows the promise of the incentive approach. In the
town of Lisbon, Connecticut, an entrepreneur proposed to locate a modem
incinerator that would generate both energy from waste and $1 million in tax
revenues. Despite the financial incentive and assurance that the incinerator
would be equipped with the latest antipollution devices, he was rebuffed.
Then the businessman tried another tactic. Instead of saying that the new
facility would bring the town $1 million a year income in additional taxes, he
promised to pay the property taxes of every landowner in the town for the
next twenty-five years. Actually, the total cost would be about the same. But
individual citizens could appreciate the direct benefits of the second
approach.
Local opposition to the undertaking quickly diminished. A town
referendum on the incinerator yielded a vote of 680 in favor and 540
opposed. But that vote was only advisory. Later on, the town planning and
zoning commission voted 5 to 4 against the project. The incentive approach,
in the case of Lisbon, can be described as producing a near miss. Yet the
incident does show the latent support for making difficult trade-offs when
citizens are provided with some reasonable -- and, in this case, imaginative -alternatives.
A more direct example of using economic incentives to locate inherently
undesirable storage facilities occurred in 1987. A proposed dump site for
medical supplies contaminated by low-level radiation was estimated to
provide about forty new jobs. Three poor communities in the Mojave Desert
region in southern California vied spiritedly fyr the project, overcoming their
concerns over possible environmental impact.
Also in 1987, Senators J. Bennett Johnston, Jr. (Democrat of Louisiana),
and James McClure (Republican of Idaho) proposed that a state agreeing to
the location of a nuclear disposal site within its borders would receive large
incentive payments from the Department of Energy. Over the thirty- to
forty-year life of the repository project, these payments would run to several
billion dollars. The governor of Nevada, a likely location, denounced the
notion as "bribery" and "nuclear blackmail." Yet, in 1978, a state blue ribbon
panel had recommended radioactive-waste disposal as a prime alternative
use of the Nevada Test Site in the event of a ban on nuclear testing. It does
seem that economic incentives can play a role in hazardous waste disposal,
but a good deal of time, patience, and effort may be required.2

1"Desert Fight for Nuclear Dump," San Francisco Chronicle, March 14,

1987, p. 5. See also Philip J. Bourque and R. Haney Scott, "Let States Bid for
Nuclear Waste Repository," Pacific Northwest Executive, October 1986, p. 1.
2

Luther J. Carter, "U.S. Nuclear Waste Program At An Impasse,"

Resources, Summer 1987, pp. 2-4.

10

material while truly dangerous substances are or will be, for lack of
space, dumped illegally or stored "temporarily." What would help is
more widespread application of the legal concept known as de
minimis non curant lex -- the law does not concern itself with trifles.

Driven by the forces of environmental politics, the
nation has repeatedly committed itself to goals and
programs that are unrealistic.
Back in 1979, a federal circuit court supported the view that
there is a de minimis level of risk too small to affect human health
adversely. It cited that doctrine in turning down the claim that some
"migration" of substances occurred from the packaging into the food
product. In 1985, the FDA concluded that using methylene chloride
to extract caffeine from coffee presented a de minimis risk. Hence,
the substance is safe for its intended use. In 1987, the National
Research Council recommended that the EPA apply a "negligible
risk" standard across the board in determinin~ how much of which
pesticides can be permitted to show up in food. 7

Cancerphobia Misallocates Resources
One approach to eliminating the gridlock in regulatory policy is
to focus on the underlying public concern that is driving the pressures for more sweeping environmental and other social regulation.
That concern is the worry about cancer. The regulatory waters have
become badly muddied by the public's misconception of the causes
of can~r. A widely. held notion is that the environment is primarily
responsible. There Is, of course, a germ of truth to that belief.
It turns out that several years ago a distinguished scientist-- John
Higginson, director of the World Health Organization's International Agency for Research on Cancer -- assigned the primary blame
for c:a~cer t.o ~hat he labele~ "environmental" causes. His highlypubliciZed fmdmg that two-thrrds of all cancer was caused by environmental factors provided ammunition for every ecological group
t? push for tougher restrictions on all sorts of environmental pollution.
However, upon a more careful reading, it is clear that the eminent scientist was referring not to the physical environment but to
!he age-old debate of "environment" versus "heredity" as the main
mfluence on hu~an beings. In the case o~ cancer, he was identifying
voluntary behavior -- such as personal life-styles and the kinds of
food people eat -- as the main culprit responsible for cancer. Dr.
Higginson specifically pointed out, "But when I used the term envi11

ronment in those days, I was considering the total environment, cultural as well as chemical ... air you breath, the culture you live in,
the agricultural habits of your community, the social cultural habits,
the social pressures, the physical chemicals with which you come in
contact, the diet, and so on. "28 But that explanation has not slowed
down the highly vocal ecology groups who latched on to a "catchy"
albeit confused theme -- the extremely carcinogenic environment in
which Americans supposedly live.
More recently, one university scientist tried to add some objectivity to the cancer debate by quantifying the issue. Professor Harry
Demopoulos of the New York Medical Center examined why
approximately 1,000 people die of cancer each day in the United
States. About 450 of the deaths, or 45 percent, are attributable to
diet. Citing the work of Dr. Arthur Upton of the National Cancer
Institute, Demopoulos noted that eating more fresh fruits and ve~
etables and curtailing fat consumption would be most helpful. 9
Clearly, obesity is not the type of environmental pollution that justifies the EPA's increasingly onerous standards.
The second major cause of cancer deaths, according to
Demopoulos, is the consumption of excessive quantities of distilled
liquor and the smoking of high-tar cigarettes. These voluntary
actions resulted in 350, or 35 percent, of the cancer deaths. Again,
this is not the environmental pollution that motivates most ecology
activists.
A distant third in the tabulation of leading causes of cancer is
occupational hazards, accounting for 5 percent of the total.
Demopoulos believes that this category may have leveled off and be
on the way down. He reasons that many of the occupationally
induced cancers are due to exposures two or more decades ago,
when scientists did not know that many chemicals were capable of
causing cancer.
A fourth category, accounting for 3 percent, is caused by exposure to normal background radiation. The fifth and last category of
causes of cancer (accounting for 2 percent) is preexisting medical
disorders. These include chronic ulcerative colitis, chronic gastritis,
and the like. The remaining 10 percent of the cancer deaths in the
United States are due to all other causes; it is noteworthy that air
and water pollution and all the other toxic hazards that are the primary cause of public worry are in this miscellaneous 10 percent, not
in the 90 percent. Government policy is unbalanced when the great
bulk of the effort deals with a category of risk that is only some fraction of one-tenth of the problem.
Hard data can dissipate much of the fear and fog generated by
the many cancer-scare stories that the public has been subjected to
12

in recent years. Overall, cancer death rates are staying steady or
coming down. The major exception is smoking-related cancer. For
the decade 1974-83, stomach cancer was down 20 percent, cancer of
the cervix-uterus was down 30 percent, and cancer of the ovary was
down 8 percent.

"We are the healthiest we have been in human history. "
Dr. Bruce Ames
University of California cancer expert
Life expectancy is steadily increasing in the United States (to an
all-time high of seventy-five, for those born in 1985)30 and in most
other industrialized nations, except the Soviet Union. This has led
the cancer expert Professor Bruce Ames of the University of California to conclude, "We are the healthiest we have been in human
history. "31 That is no justification for resting on laurels. Rather,
Ames's point should merely help lower the decibel level of debates
on environmental issues and enable analysis to dominate emotion in
setting public policy in this vital area.

A Birth Control Approach to Pollution
Over 99 percent of environmental spending by government is
devoted to controlling pollution after it is generated. Less than 1
percent is spent to reduce the generation of pollutants.32 For fiscal
1988, the EPA budgeted only $398,000 --or .03 percent of its funds
-- for "waste minimization." That is an umbrella term that includes
recycling and waste reduction. 33
The most desirable approach is to reduce the generation of pollutants in the first place. Economists have an approach that is
useful-- providing incentives to manufacturers to change their production processes to reduce the amount of wastes created or to
recycle them in a safe and productive manner.

The Hazardous Waste Example Revisited
As we noted earlier, the government taxes producers rather than
polluters. By doing that, the country misses a real opportunity to
curb actual dumping of dangerous waste. The federal Superfund
law is financed with taxes levied on producers of chemical
"feedstocks" and petroleum plus a surtax on the profits of large
manufacturing companies and contributions from the federal Treasury. Thousands of companies outside of the oil and chemical
13

industries wind up paying very little, whether they are large polluters
or not. Contrary to widely held views, a great deal of pollution
occurs in sectors of the economy other than oil and chemicals. The
manufacture of a sinfJe TV set generates about one hundred
pounds of toxic wastes. ~
Switching to a waste-end fee levied on the amount of hazardous
wastes that a company actually generates and disposes of would be
far more economically sound than the status quo. This more
enlightened approach would require a basic correction in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (or "Superfund"), but it would be a very beneficial form of hazardous waste "birth control."

Incentives to do more along these lines could be provided in several ways. The producers could be subsidized to follow the desired
approach. In this period of large budget deficits, that would, of
course, increase the amount of money that the Treasury must borrow.

The pollution tax approach appeals to self-interest in order to
achieve the public interest.

A General Application of Market Incentives
More generally, if the government were to levy a fee on the
amount of pollutants discharged, that would provide an incentive to
reduce the actual generation of wastes. Some companies would find
it cheaper to change their production processes than to pay the tax.
Recycling and reuse systems would be encouraged. Moreover, such
a tax or fee would cover imports which are now disposed of in our
country tax free. In short, rewriting statutes, such as the Superfund
law, so that they are more fair would also help protect the environment -- and would probably save money at the same time.
Already, some companies are recycling as they become aware of
the economic benefits.86 For example, one chemical firm bums
165,000 tons of coal a year at one of its textile fibers factories, generating 35,000 tons of waste in the form of fly ash. The company
recently found a local cement block company that was testing fly ash
as a replacement for limestone in making lightweight cement blocks.
The chemical company now sells the fly ash to the cement block
manufacturer. What used to be an undesirable waste by-product
has been turned into a commercially useful material. Simultaneously, the companies are conserving the supply of limestone.
A timber company, through its research, developed a new use for
tree bark, the last massive waste product of the wood products
industry. The firm designed a bark processor that made it the first
domestic producer of vegetable wax, an important ingredient in
cosmetics and polishes. A factory in Illinois had been creating a
veritable sea of calcium fluoride sludge (at the rate of 1,000 cubic
yards a month) as a by-product of its manufacture of fluorine-based
chemicals. The company found that the sludge could be mixed with
another waste product to produce synthetic fluorspar, which it had
been buying from other sources. Recycling the two waste products
now saves the firm about $1 million a year.

A different alternative is to tax the generation and disposal of
wastes. The object would not be to punish the polluters but to get
them to change their ways. If something becomes more expensive,
business firms have a natural desire to use less of the item. In this
case, the production of pollution would become more expensive.
Every sensible firm would try to reduce the amount of pollution tax
it pays by curbing its wastes. Adjusting to new taxes on pollution
would be a matter not of patriotism but of minimizing cost and
maximizing profit. The pollution tax approach appeals to self-interest in order to achieve the public interest.
Charging polluters for the pollution they cause gives companies
an incentive to fmd innovative ways to cut down on their discharges.86 These fees would raise costs and hence prices for products whose production generates a lot of pollution. It is wrong to
view this as a way of shifting the burden to the public. The relevant
factor is that consumer purchasing is not static. Consumer demand
would shift to products which pollute less -- because they would cost
less. To stay competitive, high-polluting producers would have to
economize on pollution, just as they do in the case of other costs of
production. Since pollution imposes burdens on the environment, it
is only fair that the costs of cleaning up that pollution should be
reflected in the price of a product whose production generates this
burden.
Nine countries in Western Europe have adopted the "polluter
pays" principle. In these nations, pollution control is paid for
directly by the polluting firm or from the money collected from
effiuent taxes. The West German effiuent-fee system, the oldest in
operation, began before World War I. It has succeeded in halting
the decline in water quality throughout the Ruhr Valley, the center
of West Germany's iron and steel production. It is also serving as a
model for a more recent French effort. 87
Practical problems make changes in pollution policy difficult in
the United States. Both the regulators and the regulated have an
interest in maintaining the current approach. Pollution taxes have
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little appeal in the political system, particularly in the Congress.
Many reject a pollution tax on philosophical grounds, considering
pollution charges a "license to pollute." They believe that putting a
price on the act of polluting amounts to an attitude of moral indifference towards polluters. That gets us back to the point made earlier, that many people look at ecological matters as moral issues -which makes it especially difficult to adopt a more rational and
workable approach.

Conclusion
Although economists are often accused of being patsies for the
business community, environmental economics makes for strange
alliances. So far, business interests have opposed the suggestions of
economists for such sweeping changes in the basic structure of government regulation as using taxes on pollution. Despite the shortcomings of the present system of government regulation, many firms
have paid the price of complying with existing rules. They have
learned to adjust to regulatory requirements and to integrate existing regulatory procedures into their long-term planning.
As any serious student of business-government relations will
quickly report, the debate over regulation is miscast when it is
described as black-hatted business versus white-hatted public interest groups. Almost every regulatory action creates winners and
losers in the business system and often among other interest groups.
Clean air legislation, focusing on ensuring that new facilities fully
meet standards, is invariably supported by existing firms that are
"grandfathered" approval without having to conform to the same
high standards as new firms. Regulation thus protects the "ins" from
the "outs."
There are many other examples of regulatory bias against change
and especially against new products, new processes, and new facilities. Tough emissions standards are set for new automobiles, but
not for older ones. Testing and licensing procedures for new chemicals are more rigorous and thoroughly enforced than for existing
substances. This ability to profit from the differential impacts of
regulation helps to explain why business shows little enthusiasm for
the use of economic incentives and prefers current regulatory techniques.
But the reform of regulation is truly a consumer issue. The consumer receives the benefits from regulation and bears the burden of
the costs of compliance in the form of higher prices and less product
variety. Thus, the consumer has the key stake in improving the current regulatory morass.
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